In the Matter of the Estate of Clarence I. Justheim  : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1991
In the Matter of the Estate of Clarence I. Justheim :
Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. Richard Bell; Bell & Bell; attorney for appellants.
Joseph J. Palmer, Jeffrey Robinson; Moyle & Draper; attorneys for appellee.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Justheim, No. 910244.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3562
UTAH CuOR? OF APPEALS 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. 
BRIEF 
u Ch 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ) 
CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM, ) 
Deceased. ) 
) 
Case No. 
91-0244-CA 
APPELLANTS1 AMENDED REPLY BRIEF 
This Appellants' Amended Reply Brief responds to the 
Appellee's Brief relative to the Appeal from the DECREE AND 
JUDGMENT ON VERDICT DENYING APPELLANTS1 PETITION on behalf of 
the Estate to recover 120/431 shares of Wyoming Petroleum Company 
stock from the Respondent, In The Third Judicial District Court 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. This case was heard before 
the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, District Judge. 
Joseph J. Palmer, Esq. 
Jeffrey Robinson 
Moyle & Draper 
600 Deseret Plaza 
# 15 East First South 
•* 
.«$ a J. Richard Bell 
Bell & Bell 
303 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utafaty A ^  mm 
Attorney for Appellants-
Cicftv oupreme Court, Utah 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ) 
CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM, ) 
Deceased. ) 
) 
Case No. 890419 
APPELLANTS1 AMENDED REPLY BRIEF 
This Appellants1 Amended Reply Brief responds to the 
Appellee's Brief relative to the Appeal from the DECREE AND 
JUDGMENT ON VERDICT DENYING APPELLANTS' PETITION on behalf of 
the Estate to recover 120,431 shares of Wyoming Petroleum Company 
stock from the Respondent, In The Third Judicial District Court 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. This case was heard before 
the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, District Judge. 
Joseph J. Palmer, Esq. 
Jeffrey Robinson 
Moyle & Draper 
600 Deseret Plaza 
# 15 East First South 
J. Richard Bell 
Bell & Bell 
303 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellants 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE NO. 
AUTHORITIES AND CASES (ii) 
STATUTES - RULES (ii) 
NOTE RE COMBINING AMENDED REPLY BRIEF ( iii ) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES IN REPLY BRIEF 1 
ARGUMENT 1 
CONCLUSION 8 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING BENEFICIARIES A NEW TRIAL BASED ON 
THE ALLEGED IMPROPER ADMISSION OF PAROL 
EVIDENCE 1 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT DENIED BENEFICIARIES A NEW TRIAL 
BASED ON ESTOPPEL 4 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
BY EXCLUDING EXHIBIT A, B, C AND D 
(EBERT'S BRIEF E, F, G AND H) 6 
POINT IV 
AMENDMENT OF BENEFICIARIES' REPLY BRIEF UNDER RULE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 24(c) IS PREMISSIBLE AND TIMELY 
MADE 9 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING EBERT'S MOTION 
INVOKING THE RULE JUDICATA 11 
(i) 
CASES CITED 
Edmonds v. Galey, 458 P.2d 650 (Wyo. 1969) 2 
Inter. Harvester Credit vs. Pioneer Tractor, 826 P2d. 418, 
419 (Utah 1980) 14 
Pepper v. Zions First National Bank, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 
(Utah 1990) 4, 6, 15 
Rekward v. Industrial Corn's of Utah, 755 P.2d 156 (Utah 
App. 1988) 10 
Romrell vs. Zions First Nat. Bank, N.A., 611 P.2d 392, 395, 
(Utah 1980) 9, 10, 19 
Thomas A. Paulsen Co. vs. Indus. Com'n, 770 P.2d 125, 129 
(Utah 1989) 10 
Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 p.2d 1162, 1169, (Utah 1988) . . . . 10 
CONSTITUTION, STATUTES AND COURT RULES 
Constitution of Utah, Article I Section 10 14 
Rule Utah Supreme Court, 24(c) 9, 19 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103 2 
(ii) 
NOTE RE REPLY BRIEF 
The first eight pages of this Reply Brief are identical with 
the Reply Brief as originally filed. The additional pages of 9 
through 19 are based on the Court's Order permitting the amending 
of the Reply Brief limited to ten pages relative to Utah Supreme 
Court Rule 24(c) and the Res Judicata Ruling. 
REFERENCES TO THE RECORD - ABBREVIATIONS 
There are five volumes of testimony. They are not paginated. Only the 
first page of each volume bears a Record paginated page number. 
R123 - R followed by numbers designates the court file 
R1209-49 - R followed by four numbers, a dash and additional numbers 
designates the volume of the transcript followed by the 
page number. 
Exhibit Rl - R followed by a number designates the Trial Exhibit number 
Exhibit Bl - B followed by a number designates a copy of a Trial 
Exhibit which is attached to the Brief. 
(iii) 
OPENING STATEMENT OF ISSUES IN REPLY BRIEF 
This Brief is in reply to the Appellee's Brief, sometimes 
hereinafter called Ebert's Brief, and is limited basically in its 
response to the three points of argument advanced by Ebert in his 
brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING BENEFICIARIES A NEW TRIAL BASED ON THE ALLEGED 
IMPROPER ADMISSION OF PAROL EVIDENCE. 
The parol evidence rule is a substantive rule of law. 
It is not a rule of evidence. The cases which hold evidence 
violative of the parol evidence rule must be excluded, even 
though admitted without objection, and these cases emphasize the 
substantiveness of the rule. Because it is a rule of substantive 
law, the time at which the rule may be invoked differs markedly 
from the time at which a rule of evidence must be invoked. In 
fact, the time element of invoking the rule is the hallmark and 
is the only difference between the two rules. If there is no 
time difference in which the rules must be invoked, then it is 
difficult to perceive that any effect has been given to the words 
that the parol evidence rule is a "substantive rule of law". 
The Utah cases provided in Ebert's Brief appear to set 
the same time standard for invoking the two rules, requiring that 
each must be invoked timely during trial. But, it does not 
appear from the cases that the substantiveness of the parol 
evidence rule has ever been addressed by the Court. Ebert's 
brief does not meet the issue raised by the beneficiaries that 
the parol evidence rule is one of substantive law. The beneficiar 
lay before the Court the question of whether the substantiveness 
of the rule enlarges the time in which it may be invoked, and 
requires that evidence violative of the parol evidence rule, even 
though admitted without objection, must be excluded when the rule 
is invoked in a post-trial motion, at least under the facts of thi 
case. The cases cited by the beneficiaries are from those juris-
dictions which have acknowledged the substantiveness of the rule 
and given affect to it with the result being it is not necessary 
to object to the admission of the evidence which is in violation 
of the parol evidence rule during the trial. The objection may 
be first raised following the trial and some cases permit the 
raising of the objection even at a later date. The beneficiaries 
invoked the parol evidence rule following trial in a connection 
with several motions including the motion for a new trial. 
The beneficiaries have no argument with Rule 103 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. Those rules are just what the title 
states—rules of evidence. Parol evidence rule is not the rule 
of evidence but a substantive rule of law, and therefore 
distinguishable from and not subject to the Rules of Evidence. 
The appellees cite the case of Edmonds v. Galey, 458 
P.2d 650 (Wyo. 1969) in which the Court said: 
[T]he parol evidence rule, like most things, has its 
exceptions. It does not apply where the writing is 
collateral to the issue involved, and the action is 
not based on such writing. To state it another way, 
the parol evidence rule applies only where the 
enforcement of an obligation created by the writing 
is substantially the cause of action. . . . 
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Justheim's Codicil is the "writing" and is substantially the cause 
of action in this case. It is the Codicil which Respondent 
Ebert's attorney states "would be submitted to the Probate Court 
for final determination"; and further informed Ebert "that the 
Codicil was written evidence of Clarence's intent to give Ray the 
stock" (Ebert's brief, Page 12). It was the Codicil upon which 
Ebert relied to transfer Justheim's stock as his letter to the 
transfer agent, in which Ebert enclosed a copy of the Codicil, 
states "the Codicil bequeathed to me all of Clarence I. Justheim's 
interest in Wyoming Petroleum Corp." (emphasis added. Exhibit I, 
Beneficiaries1 Brief). In May 1984, Ebert wrote to the accountant, 
John Dinero, who was working on the Inventory for the Estate: 
"In May, 1981, C.I.J, signed a Codicil to his 
Will giving me all of his holdings in Wyo. Pet. 
He also handed me certificates (120,431 shares) 
stating "don't let Bud (J. H. Morgan, Jr.) know 
anything about these" (Exhibit 1, Appellant's 
Brief) (emphasis added). 
Ebert relied on the Codicil as a valid testamentary instrument in 
which he was "bequeathed" all of Justheim's stock in Wyoming 
Petroleum, in his dealings with John Morgan resulting in Ebert's 
control and becoming President of Wyoming Petroleum three months 
after Justheim's death. Trial Exhibits A, B, C and D which are 
subject matter of POINT III hereof and which are letters of Morgan 
to Ebert and show the assertion by Ebert of the validity of the 
Codicil and his reliance thereon as well as the acceptance of 
that representation by Morgan. 
Without the Codicil, Ebert's claim to the stock is 
reduced to a naked oral claim or statement that the stock is his 
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by virtue of two inter vivos gifts from the deceased* Ebert 
needs and must have the Codicil in order to support his claim, 
particularly as he is the Trustee for the beneficiaries and 
Executor of the estate, and his claim as an individual is 
diametrically opposed to the interests of the estate and the 
beneficiaries of the Trust. The Codicil is the very heart of 
Ebert's position as well as the basis of the claims of the 
beneficiaries. This is a proper case in which to give effect to 
the substantiveness of the parol evidence rule and apply it to 
the evidence of this case particularly as a result of Ebert's 
close and unique relationship with Justheim, combined with his 
duty and loyalty as Trustee and Executor. Pepper v. Zions First 
National Bank, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 9 (Utah 1990) imposed upon 
Ebert the highest duty of care and loyalty: 
Executors and trustees are charged as 
fiduciaries with one of the highest duties 
of care and loyalty known in the law. . . . 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
IT DENIED BENEFICIARIES A NEW TRIAL BASED ON ESTOPPEL 
All of the cases cited by Ebert are cases in which the 
parties are alive and before the Court, but the main party and actor 
involved in this case, Clarence Justheim, is deceased and on that 
basis alone, those cases are distinguishable from the present case. 
As noted in Ebert's brief, he had a long relationship with Justheim. 
However, it wasn't until Justheim was elderly and became incapaci-
tated as a result of an automobile accident that the uniqueness 
of the relationship ripened into an unusual one where Ebert was 
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almost his sole contact with the outside world as stated in 
Appellant1s Brief: 
. . .For some five years, Ray spent six days a week, 
twenty minutes to five hours a day helping Clarence 
and Chickie. Ray visited Clarence, typed his 
personal correspondence, delivered his personal 
and corporate mail for him, assisted him in his 
personal affairs, shopped for him, helped him care 
for his invalid wife, and generally provided him 
the kind of comfort and companionship a confined 
person craves. . . . (Appellant's Brief, Page 7) 
(reference to transcript omitted) 
Further, as noted, Justheim amended his Trust on five occasions, 
the last being January 1981, two months prior to preparation of 
the Codicil. In the last Amendment, Justheim added Ebert as a 
.005% residuary beneficiary of the trust. Amendments were made 
with the assistance of an attorney. There are frequent contacts 
with Justheim's attorney. Obviously, there was availability of 
an attorney to assist in the estate planning at every stage. The 
Will and the Amendments to the Trust are evidence of the particu-
larity and thoroughness with which Justheim acted in matters of 
his estate. Ebert, as Trustee, had signed the Trust and the 
Amendments thereto and was aware of Justheim's estate planning. 
Notwithstanding Ebert's knowledge of the foregoing, his duty and 
loyalty to the beneficiaries as Trustee, his appointment as 
Executor of the estate, he prepared a Codicil which conflicted 
with his claim of inter vivos gifts asserted after the death of 
Justheim. He prepared a Codicil in which Ebert has Justheim's say 
that Justheim owns 50% of the stock of Wyoming Petroleum, but if 
the 120,000 shares of the first gift are taken into account, 
Justheim owned less than 5% of the stock at the time Ebert prepared 
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the Codicil. Ebert had the control and power to disclose the 
ownership to be 5% and not 50% as to the amount of stock ownership 
by Justheim. He drafted and typed the Codicil. He authored or 
co-authored and created the Codicil. He, as any individual in 
society, owed the duty not to knowingly misrepresent a fact and 
certainly not to misrepresent the fact when the fact is designed 
to come to life or be published only when the other co-author is 
deceased. Ebert had an active hand in the misrepresentation set 
forth in the Codicil. Even if it be assumed that Ebert's role is 
only one of silence, the Pepper case (P. 7) holds the silence as 
equivalent to fraudulent misrepresentation when there is a duty 
to speak. Ebert had such a duty to speak. He should have told 
or reminded Justheim something to the effect "you just recently 
made me a beneficiary of your Trust and the Wyoming stock is a 
substantial asset of your estate and I suggest we get your attorney 
to draw up some papers so that this matter can be handled by him 
as I am the Trustee and I do not want to have to explain to the 
beneficiaries. I would prefer the attorney do that." 
Ebert chose silence and that silence should be continued by the 
application of estoppel. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
EXCLUDING EXHIBIT A, B, C AND D 
(EBERTfS BRIEF E, F, G AND H) 
Exhibits A, B, C and D flush out the relationship 
between the parties and give background as to how Justheim ran 
his affairs. They explain why Justheim said: "...Be damn sure 
to don't let Bud" Morgan know about the Wyoming stock, and why 
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Ebert never responded to the letters. Exhibits 1 and 3, 
Beneficiaries Brief. As already noted, they show the representa-
tion and reliance of Ebert on the Codicil. Exhibit A (Exhibit E 
of Ebert's brief) dated October 10, 1983, three months after 
Justheim's death, discloses that "you have indicated to me that 
Clarence, by his Will, had given you all of his stock in Wyoming 
Petroleum Corporation. You mentioned that this was contained in 
one of the Amendments or Codicil to Clarence's Will." (emphasis 
added) Although Morgan is not pleased with the estimentary 
disposition, he accepts the representation without qualification 
as Morgan states further "you are obviously in control of Wyoming 
Petroleum Corporation." 
Exhibit B shows the receipt by Morgan of a copy of the 
Will but no Codicil is furnished. It points out that the Will 
does not deal with the stock and reiterates that the Codicil is 
the basis of Ebert's claim to the stock. It throws light on how 
the control stock was obtained in a few short sentences and shows 
how the Will and the Trust operate. It does, particularly in 
retrospect, attack the credibility of Ebert in his statements. 
Exhibit C, dated December 4, 1983, does cover some of 
the same territory and points out that the change in the Will 
deprives beneficiaries of the stock. More importantly, Morgan is 
still not informed at this time of the claim of gifts and has not 
been furnished a copy of the Codicil. Although Ebert is not 
under duty to furnish Morgan with a copy, Ebert's claim of having 
received the stock under the Codicil had had great impact on 
their relationship and the management of Wyoming Petroleum and 
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vividly demonstrates the silence and unwillingness of Ebert to 
disclose the circumstances surrounding the stock. 
Exhibit D, dated January 21, 1983, acknowledges receipt 
of a copy of the Codicil and discloses the defectiveness of it 
and then goes on to ask a series of questions which anyone knowing 
the thoroughness of Justheim would raise and want answers to 
including the beneficiaries. 
These letters further show the strength and the assurance 
with which Ebert informed and convinced Morgan that he received 
the stock by virtue of the Codicil. It is demonstrative of an 
attitude and course of conduct which again affects his credibility 
and shows the relationship of the parties. They bear on the 
issues of loyalty to the beneficiaries and the credibility of 
Ebert and impeachment of Ebert. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Lower Court did 
commit error and the beneficiaries should be awarded a new trial 
and such other relief as the Court may deem proper. 
Dated this 14th day of January, 1991. 
BELL & BELL by 
/jj Richard Bell 
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POINT IV 
AMENDMENT OF BENEFICIARIES' REPLY BRIEF UNDER RULE UTAH SUPREME 
COURT 24(c) IS PERMISSIBLE AND TIMELY MADE 
The Appellant-Beneficiaries for the first time in this Amended 
Reply Brief raise the issue of the trial court order invoking 
the rule of res judicata which excluded all evidence regarding 
the beneficiaries claims of Ebert's undue influence and confidential 
relationship with the deceased, Clarence I. Justheim, as well as 
Ebert's fiduciary duty of loyalty and care to the Justheim Trust, 
and that the claimed gifts of stock by Ebert, the Trustee and 
Executor, are presumptively invalid. Rule 24(c) provides: 
...Reply Brief shall be limited to answering any new 
matter set forth in the opposing brief.... 
Does this rule prohibit the appellants from raising the res 
judicata ruling in this Amended Reply Brief. We submit it does 
not, although it is acknowledged that to do so is neither the 
preferred nor the best procedure. This court first examined the 
predecessor of Rule 24(c) in Romrell v. Zions First Nat. Bank, N. A., 
611 P.2d 392, 395, (Utah 1980): 
...As a general rule, an issue raised initially in a 
reply brief will not be considered on appeal since a 
reply brief as stated in Rule 75(p)(2), "shall be 
limited to answering any new matter set forth in 
respondent's brief...." Nevertheless, the Court, in 
its discretion, may decide a case upon any points 
that its proper disposition may require, even if first 
raised in a reply brief. (Citation omitted) 
Whether the court will act on a "first raised" issue is clearly 
discretionary with the court. "Proper disposition" of the case 
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is the standard by which the discretion is invoked. Romrell is the 
only case in which relief has been granted on a "first raised" 
issue. However, in two other cases in which Rule 24(c) has been 
raised, the court, after enforcing the rule, has pointed out the 
footnote in each case which indicates that the court has examined 
the first raised issue and found it to be meritless. Due process 
did not give the appellant a jury trial on a contempt charge. Von 
Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d, 1162, 1169 (Utah 1988). In the case of 
Thomas A. Paulsen Co. vs. Indus. Com'n, 770 P.2d, 1.25, 129 (Utah 
1989) the footnote points out that the issue was not raised in the 
motion for review before the Commission, and the footnote further 
provides: 
...Further, our review of the entire record persuades 
us that Paulsen has, in fact, had ample opportunity to 
contest every significant issue in the case.... 
The Court of Appeals of Utah in Rekward v. Industrial Com'n of 
Utah, 755 P.2d, 166 (Utah App. 1988) followed the rule but, in the 
spirit of the Romrell case, noted that: 
...Rekward did not request a hearing at the adminis-
trative proceeding, nor did he raise the issue in his 
motion for review before the Commission.... 
In the present case, the question of res judicata was squarely before 
the trial court, but the trial court's ruling denied the beneficiaries 
not only the ample opportunity but any opportunity to lay before the 
jury the significant issue of Ebert's confidential relationship 
with Justheim, Ebert's fiduciary duty of loyalty to the Justheim 
trust and the presumptive invalidity of the claimed gifts of stock. 
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POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING EBERT1S MOTION INVOKING THE RULE 
OF RES JUDICATA 
In 1984 the beneficiaries brought a petition to remove Ray 
Ebert from his capacity as Personal Representative (Executor) of the 
estate and to recover from Ebert, as an individual, on behalf of the 
estate shares of corporate stock which Ebert claimed to have received 
as an individual by virtue of an intervivos gift from Justheim. Ebert 
is and at all times has been the trustee of the Clarence I. Justheim 
Trust, Exhibit 9(d), signed in 1978, into which all the assets of 
Justheim1s estate are to be poured pursuant to Justheim1s Will still 
being probated. The appellants are beneficiaries of the trust. 
In 1984 the Court entered a Pretrial Order bifurcating the 
removal of Ebert as Executor from the claimed gifts of stock. The 
removal trial was heard in 1986. The gift trial was tried in 1989, 
following which this appeal was filed. 
On the first day of trial, June 13, 1989, there was filed and 
the court granted Ebert's Motion in Limine, excluding all evidence 
regarding the heirs1 and beneficiaries1 claims: 
"1. that Ebert obtained the Wyoming Petroleum 
Company stock by exercising undue influence over 
Clarence I. Justheim as framed by the October 30, 
1984 Pretrial Order, Section IV, Paragraph F. 
2. that Ebert was a fiduciary to, a confidential 
advisor to, or in a confidential relationship with 
Justheim as framed by the October 30, 1984 Pretrial 
Order, Section IV, Paragraph G. 
3. that Ebert owed a fiduciary duty of loyalty 
and care to Justheim and to the Justheim trust when the 
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alleged Wyoming Petroleum Company stock gifts were made 
as framed by the October 30, 1984 Pretrial Order, 
Section V, Paragraph B. 
4. that the Wyoming Petroleum Company stock gifts 
are presumptively invalid because of Ebert's relationship 
with Justheim as framed by the October 30, 1984 Pretrial 
Order, Section V, Paragraph C." (emphasis added) 
The Memorandum filed in support of the Motion maintained the Findings 
of Fact entered in the removal trial held that the appellants had 
failed in their burden of proof to prove each of the above items. 
Copies of the Motion in Limine, R2526 and Memorandum in Support 
thereof, R2529 are attached hereto as Exhibits 1 and 2, respectively 
and the Minute Entry at R2563. The Order prohibited the presentation 
of any evidence regarding beneficiaries' claims as above set forth. 
Trial proceeded and the jury decided six to two in favor of Ebert. 
The trial court was very clear in its granting of the Order: 
"THE COURT: All right. Well, based on that, then, the 
Motion in Limine will be granted. I think the record 
is clear as to what the nature of your motion is and 
what the nature of my order is on that, so there will 
not be any evidence allowed in the trial that the 
relevance is premised solely upon undue influence, 
fiduciary obligation, or confidential relationship. 
Nor will any reference be allowed to such evidence or 
to such theories in opening statements or in closing 
statement or in anything else that comes before this 
Jury." (R2898-7 and 8) 
Neither the 1984 Pre Trial Order nor the Findings of Fact, 
or the Conclusions of Law of the Removal Trial justify the Res 
Judicata Order. This is clearly shown in the Supplemental Pretrial 
Order approved by respective counsel and signed by the court on 
June 9, 1989, just four days prior to granting the Res Judicata 
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Order. The Supplemental Pretrial Order has attached to it three 
exhibits which are: 
Exhibit A—1984 Pretrial Order 
Exhibit B—Notice of Amendment to Pretrial Order 
Exhibit C—Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the 
Removal Trial 
All of the foregoing are marked R2490 through R2525. 
The Amended Order and Exhibits provide: 
1. The four issues of fact and law were excluded in the 
Res Judicata Order. Amended Order, R2492. 
2. The Amended Order provides that "On May 26, 1986, the 
heirs submitted and all parties agreed to proposed 
amendment to the Pretrial Order. A copy of which 
is attached hereto as Exhibit B." which raised issues 
that Ebert failed to give notice to the beneficiaries, 
misrepresented the size of the estate, and had been 
deceptive and secretive. R2509. 
3. The Findings, after noting that the parties had 
stipulated that the court would reserve and not 
then determine the gift issue provided: 
" . . . These Findings and Conclusions are not 
intended to be the findings and conclusions 
on that issue." R2515. 
Ebert1s Memorandum in support of his Motion discloses 
the same to the court. Exhibit 2, Page 3, R2531. 
The record does not disclose that the reason for bifurcation 
was that the beneficiaries maintained that they were entitled to a 
jury to try the gift issue. There is no other reason for bifurcation. 
The Amended Pretrial Order demonstrates that the parties intended 
a full hearing on the merits on the gift issue. It enlarged the 
issues to be tried. The trial court in the Removal Case did not 
intend that the Findings would apply to the gift issue and so stated. 
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A jury trial on the gift issue required a full hearing on the merits 
as also required by law. The right of a jury trial in a civil case 
is guaranteed by the Constitution of Utah/ Art. I Section 10, 
Inter. Harvester Credit vs. Pioneer Tractor, 826 P2d. 418, 419 
(Utah 1981). The foregoing authority appears in the beneficiaries1 
Memorandum in Opposition to Strike Jury Demand. R2409. The 
restriction of the evidence by the Res Judicata ruling is contrary 
to the intention of the parties and the court to have a separate 
and distinct trial on the gift issue and violates the constitutional 
guarantee as well. The Amended Pretrial Order was not attached, 
no motion was made to amend the same. Nothing changed in the 
four days between the time the Order was entered and the filing 
and granting of the Motion in Limine except the position by Ebert 
and the Court's acquiesence therein. 
In the same hearing the matter of the failure of Ebert to 
give notice to the beneficiaries was before the court. The 
beneficiaries claimed that in addition to his duty as Executor he 
had the fiduciary duty as Trustee to keep the beneficiaries informed, 
and that he did, in fact, have the addresses, contrary to his claim 
that he did not have the addresses, R2898-61-63, a copy of which 
Z 
is attached hereto as Exhibit 4. At page 63, there is the following: 
"MR. BELL: All I'm claiming for that is the fact that h e — 
first of all, he doesn't tell them there is anything going on. 
It is hush-hush, so to speak. Nobody except him knows what 
is going on, and he is trying to keep the whole thing quiet. 
THE COURT: It sounds like undue influence to me. (emphasis 
added) 
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Undue influence was neither the issue nor the thrust of the 
thrust of the beneficiaries' position, for these acts of omission 
took place after Justheim's death and had nothing to do with 
undue influence. There was no assertion of undue influence on 
Mr. Justheim. What was being urged upon the court were the 
separateness and single identity or capacity of the trustee as 
opposed to the executor or Ebert as an individual, and his duty 
as trustee. These are two important elements the court failed to 
apparently perceive, which are the subject matter and are dealt 
with by the court in its recent case of Pepper vs. Zions First 
National Bank, 147 Adv. Rep. 5. The element of the duty of a 
trustee is clearly spelled out by the court: 
"Executors and Trustees are charged as fiduciaries with one of 
the highest duties of care and loyalty known in the law." P9. 
The other element of separateness of capacities or entities runs to 
the issue of res judicata and the Pepper case spoke directly on that 
issue: 
"A party appearing in an action in on capacity, individual 
or representative, is not thereby bound by or entitled to 
the benefits of the rules of res judicata in a subsequent 
action in which he appears in another capacity." P10. 
The notice given by Ebert under the probate code referred to 
by Attorney Palmer R62 is of great importance. The only person 
receiving notice under the Probate Code in this case was Mrs. 
Justheim, there being no children. Ebert had been appointed her 
Conservator. Ebert received notice from Ebert. So in fact, 
there was no notice given. 
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CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP 
The reason, obviously, Ebert wanted to invoke the Res Judicata 
rule was that the evidence being excluded was materially damaging 
to his position and in favor of the beneficiaries. Limitation of 
the size of this brief does not permit setting forth the evidence, 
but the element of confidential relationship is very important. 
Ebert admitted in the removal trial that he had a confidential 
relationship with Justheim. This evidence was in connection with 
Exhibit 32 which was an Affidavit filed in a collateral estate matter 
in which Mr. Ebert stated that he was the "Administrative Assistant, 
courier, confidante and general 'right-hand man1." The following 
took place in the transcript of that trial at pages 7 and 8: 
"Q (By Mr. Bell) And I hand you what has been marked as 
Exhibit 32. You've already seen it. You signed the document? 
A That is correct. 
Q When did you sign it? 
A It states that I signed it on May 16, 1984. 
Q And you went to work for him as Administrative Assistant. 
Would you tell the court what your meaning of "Administrative 
Assistant" is. 
A Helping Clarence Justheim do whatever he wanted done. 
Q And you also say you went to work for him as a courier. 
A That was part of the things he wanted done. 
Q And as a confidant. 
A That's correct. 
Q What does the term "confidant" mean to you? 
A Takes me into his confidence on matters that he wants to. 
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Q As a general right-hand man; what do you mean by "general 
right-hand man"? 
A Once again, do anything that Mr. Justheim wanted me to do. 
Q Did you think you had a confidential relationship with him? 
A That is correct. 
0 Now, you went to work in 1978; and what were your daily 
obligations or duties or things that you did routinely? 
A Routinely I'd stop at the office and pick up the mail for 
Clarence Justheim and Justheim Petroleum and Wyoming 
Petroleum and any of his personal mail, take it up to 
him at the condominium. 
0 So you brought him the corporate mail as well as 
his personal mail? 
A That is correct. 
Q Did he tell you what to do with that mail? 
A That is correct. 
Q And did you do that? 
A Yes. 
Q And about how many hours — was this five days a week? 
A Six days a week." 
The court implemented its ruling on confidential relationship by 
asking: 
"Mr. Robinson, over the evening, prepare for me a 
Jury instruction—not to be given yet—with the Jury 
instructions themselves at the end of the case, but 
one that I can use during the trial in the event 
something happens that the Jury needs to be told 
right out of the chute that that's not an issue they 
need to worry about. And perhaps it may be drafted 
in such a way that Mr. Bell will even agree with it." 
This resulted in Instruction Number 18 to the Jury which sweepingly 
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enforced the court's res judicata ruling. R2646. 
The record shows that the foregoing matters were discussed 
thoroughly in chambers, R2898-5, and that the court had decided 
to grant Ebert's Motion, the court stating: 
This matter was discussed in Chambers among counsel, 
and my inquiry to Mr. Bell was whether or not there 
was any further evidence regarding undue influence, 
fiduciary relationship, and the like, which he 
intends to put on as evidence, which was not previously 
presented at the removal trial. 
Based upon what you indicated to me and that that 
is there was no additional evidence that had not 
previously been presented, it would be my intent 
at this time to grant the Motion in Limine insofar 
as that matter, then the matter becomes res judicata, 
having previously been decided on identical evidence 
in a different context by Judge Fishier. 
Now is your opportunity to persuade me otherwise. 
The Appellants did not persuade the court to do "otherwise", and 
unfortunately the proceedings in chambers on the motion which led 
the court to its conclusion was not put of record and to comment 
thereon would be pure speculation except for the highlight that only 
additional evidence, of which there was none, could to be submitted 
and become part of the record. But those unreported proceedings 
led the court to its conclusion. Ebert had the burden of sustaining 
his motion but the chamber proceedings switched the burden from him 
to the beneficiaries. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the case law, the raising for the first time on appeal 
the issue of res judicata in this Reply Brief, is reasonable and 
timely. The difference between this and the Romrell case (ID) is that 
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the beneficiaries raised the issue by Motion to Amend their Reply 
Brief rather than including it in the Reply Brief and in deference 
to Rule 24(c)f filed their Motion to Amend the Reply Brief, 
rather than to assume the new material could be presented without 
permission of the court. The difference between this case and 
the Romrell case is one of procedure resulting in a few additional 
days of time which is not damaging to Ebert, but does respect 
Rule 24(c) as written, absent the court's interpretation in the 
case law. 
The court erred in invoking the rule of res judicata, and 
the beneficiaries should be awarded a new trial so that the matter 
of the gift issue is fully and properly presented to the jury. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 25th day of February, 1991. 
BELL & BELL, by 
i^ ^ 
X J . \ R i c h a r d Bell 
V^AtJzorney for B e n e f i c i a r i e s 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate 
of 
CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM, 
Deceased. 
SUPPLEMENTAL PRETRIAL ORDER 
Probate No. 83-695 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
On Thursday, June 8, 1989, a pretrial conference was 
held before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy pursuant to Rule 16 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Joseph J. Palmer and 
Jeffrey Robinson appeared as counsel for Raymond A. Ebert, 
personal representative. J. Richard Bell appeared as legal 
counsel for respondents, Priscilla Knight, as personal 
representative of the Estate of Charles Justheim, Madelaine L. 
Harris, Patricia J. Brown, St. Mark's Episcopal Cathedral Parish 
and Dean of St. Mark's Episcopal Cathedral Parish. The following 
action was taken: 
mb.jrjupp-tor.dj fc-ckiU _L 
OQZA'Jt) 
This matter arises by reason of the heirs1 Removal 
Petition and Mr. Ebert's Objections thereto. Notice thereof was 
given all interested parties and they were thereafter placed on 
this Court's trial calendar. To assist the Court in framing the 
applicable issues for trial before the Court, the parties 
submitted a Pretrial Order on October 30, 1984. A copy is 
attached as Exhibit A. On May 26, 1986, the heirs submitted and 
all parties agreed to a proposed amendment to the Pretrial Order. 
A copy is attached as Exhibit B. The Removal Petition and the 
Pretrial Orders framed two issues: (1) the removal of Mr. Ebert 
as personal representative of the Estate of Clarence I. Justheim; 
and (2) the challenge to two intervivos gifts to Mr. Ebert of 
151,143 shares of stock in Wyoming Petroleum Company. Mr. 
Ebert's objections to the Removal Petition prayed for 
confirmation of the Wyoco stock gifts to him. 
Prior to trial in 1986, the parties stipulated that the 
Court might reserve for later determination the issue of whether 
Mr. Justheim made valid intervivos gifts of the Wyoming Petroleum 
Company common stock to Mr. Ebert, and that the parties might 
offer further evidence on that issue, and the court so ordered 
(see pg. 3 of Findings of Fact of 7/31/86). On May 27, 28, 29, 
30, June 3, 23, 25, July 21 and 28, 1986, this Court tried the 
issue of Mr. Ebert's removal as personal representative based on 
the issues as framed by the amended Pretrial Order. On July 31, 
1986, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered which 
resolved the issues relating to Mr. Ebert's removal as personal 
mb.jrjupp-tor.dj ** 
ocnM 
representative. A copy is attached as Exhibit C. Based on the 
October 30, 1984 Pretrial Order, the May 26, 1986 Amendment and 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by this Court 
on July 31, 1986, the only issues of fact now before this Court 
are paragraphs A through H of Section IV and the only issues of 
law now before the Court are paragraphs A through D and F of 
Section V of the Pretrial Order of October 30, 1984. 
DATED: June f 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
f. 
The Honorable Michael' R. 
District Court Judge 
urphy 
APPROVED BY: 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
fc-*r4~csi»>$4*~~— 
timer 
y^ ROEinson 
Attorneys for Raymond A. Ebert, 
Personal Representative 
BELL & BELL 
Jl. Richard Bell 
Attorney for Heirs and 
-* Beneficiaries 
mb.jrjupp-tor.dj 
00243;', 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on June ff , 1989, a copy of the 
Supplemental Pretrial Order was hand-delivered to: 
J. Richard Bell 
BELL & BELL 
303 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
Attorneys for Heirs and 
Beneficiaries 
Kent M. Kasting 
DART, ADAMSON AND KASTING 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Douglas C. Mortensen 
MATHESON, JEPPSON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN 
648 East First South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Clark P, Giles 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of 
PRETRIAL ORDER CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM, 
Deceased. Civil No. P-83-695 
(Judge Fishier) 
IT IS ORDERED: 
I. Petitioners seek in this Action to: 
A. Recover from respondent Raymond A. Ebert (hereinafter 
"Ebert") and his donees, for the benefit of the Estate of Clarence 
I. Justheim, 151,143 shares of Wyoming Petroleum stock claimed to 
have been the subject of a gift from Clarence I. Justheim 
(hereinafter "Justheim") to Ebert. 
B. Remove Ebert as Trustee of each of the Trusts created 
or to be created pursuant to the Justheim intervivos trust, dated 
June 22, 1978, as amended (hereinafter collectively the "Justheim 
Trust"). 
C. Remove Ebert as personal representative of the Estate 
of Clarence I. Justheim (hereinafter the "Justheim Estate"). 
II. Contentions of the Parties: 
A. Petitioners claim: (1) that Ebert improperly caused 
151,143 shares of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation, assets of either 
002433 
the Justheim Estate or the Justheim Trust, to be transferred into 
his and his donees1 names; (2) that said stock was never given to 
Ebert by Justheim either during Justheimfs life or by a valid 
testimentary transfer; (3) that Ebert obtained possession of the 
stock certificates either in his capacity as trustee to the 
Justheim Trust, as confidential advisor or fiduciary to Justheim, 
as conservator to Justheim, or as personal representative to the 
Justheim Estate; (4) that in the event Justheim did give all or 
part of said stock to Ebert, such gift or gift were made as a 
result of undue influence by Ebert in his position as trustee, 
confidential advisor or fiduciary to Justheim, or that said gift 
or gifts were given to Ebert not in his individual capacity, but 
as trustee of the Justheim Trust, or that such gift or gifts were 
not intended by Justheim to take effect until after Justheim1s 
death; (5) that Ebert, as personal representative of the Justheim 
Estate, should have sought court approval of the alleged gifts 
prior to the transfer of said shares into Ebert's and his donees1 
names; (6) that Ebert, as personal representative, has committed 
misfeasance in his untimely filing of a federal gift tax return 
reporting the alleged gift or gifts and in the valuation of said 
stock contained in said gift tax return; (7) that Ebert has 
otherwise misrepresented the value of said stock in documents 
filed with the Court; and (8) that Ebert should be removed as 
personal representative of the Justheim Estate as trustee of the 
Justheim Trust as a result of the above actions. 
B. Respondent claims: 
This proceeding is instigated by John H. Morgan, Jr. 
("Morgan") who directly or through his attorneys, solicited the 
Petitioners to file the Petition and is paying all costs and 
attorneys' fees. Morgan did so because Ebert is unwilling to 
invest Justheim funds he controls in fiduciary capacities in 
Morgan dominated enterprises as decedent did during his life. 
Morgan considers it to be in his business interest to effect the 
removal of Ebert from all fiduciary capacities in which he makes 
or will make investment decisions with respect to assets owned by 
decedent at the time of his death. In particular, respondent 
claims: 
1. That he had known Justheim and been associated in 
business ventures with him for approximately 40 years before 
Justheim's death. 
2. During the last 5 years of Justheim's life (after 
Justheim was injured in a 1978 car accident), respondent 
voluntarily, without compensation, went to Justheim's home on a 
daily basis and assisted him in business and personal affairs 
including care for Justheim's invalid and incompetent wife, and 
respondent considered himself to be Justheim's closest personal 
friend. 
3. Justheim had no children and for many years had had 
no significant contact or continuing relationship with any members 
of his immediate family, except his wife. Justheim adequately 
provided for his wife in his will and respondent promised Justheim 
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he would watch over Justheim's wife. Hence, respondent was a 
natural object of Justheim's bounty. 
4. Justheim, on his own account, for that of Justheim 
Petroleum Company, in which he had a controlling stock position 
and as a director of Wyoming Petroleum Company ("Wyco"), had 
invested hundreds of thousands of dollars in Morgan dominated 
enterprises between 1975 and 1983; and none of those investments 
had been the source of any return by the time of Justheim's 
death. Morgan frequently visited Justheim after the 1978 car 
accident when Justheim was confined to his home. Morgan was the 
dominant person in a confidential relationship with Justheim; he 
intimidated and bullied Justheim and influenced him unfairly to 
take actions favorable to Morgan. Justheim was afraid and 
resentful of Morgan, refcognized he was being manipulated by 
Morgan, and planned to assure that Morgan's domination of 
Justheim*s estate did not continue beyond Justheim's death. 
5. Justheim and John Morgan, Sr., Morgan's father, had 
each owned or controlled the same number of Wyco shares and 
together held about 90% of its outstanding stock. After Morgan 
Sr.'s death in February of 1982, Justheim purchased additional 
Wyco stock to control it, and thereafter Morgan hounded Justheim 
to sell him one-half the additional stock. Justheim acquired the 
stock to prevent Morgan from raiding Wyco's treasury for Morgan's 
limited partnerships, and his desire to assure that result as well 
as his desire to show appreciation for Ebert's friendship 
motivated Justheim to make the gifts here in question. 
-4-
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6. Justheim gave his Wyco stock to Ebert by handing him 
120r431 shares around May 15, 1981 and 30,712 shares about May 4, 
1982 (the former were endorsed off, the latter were not) and 
expressed donative intent in each case, and he directed Ebert not 
to have the shares transferred into his hame until after 
Justheim's death, but to keep the gift secret so that Justheim 
would not have to endure repeated confrontation with Morgan, Jr. 
The transfer of the stock was not a matter of practical 
consequence because Wyco had not held shareholders meetings, paid 
dividends or held formal directors meetings for many years. The 
Wyco stock was only a small portion of Justheim's estate. 
7. Justheim discussed his intent to make such gifts and 
his motives with his attorney, Frank J. Allen, and they seemed 
perfectly appropriate to Allen. Allen had such a relationship 
with Justheim that Allen would have spoken up if the gifts had not 
seemed appropriate. 
8. The 5/29/81 codicil to Justheim's will, which gave to 
Ebert all of Justheim's Wyco stock, while invalid as a codicil 
because it is not witnessed, further- evidences the gifts, and when 
Justheim made the second gift in 1982, he told Ebert that 
endorsement was not necessary because of the codicil. 
9. Ebert was not a fiduciary of Justheim's until April, 
1983 when he was appointed conservator of Justheim's estate, 
though Ebert in 1978 signed Justheim's Trust Agreement to 
establish, for $25.00, a "pourover" trust to receive the residue 
of Justheim's estate on his death. 
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10. Shortly after Justheim's death, Ebert discussed the 
facts surrounding the Wyco stock gifts with Allen, and concurred 
with Allen's advice that those facts would be submitted to the 
Probate Court for a determination as to the validity of the gifts 
when the Inventory was filed. The Inventory was complicated, 
appraisals of the inventoried assets were difficult to obtain, 
delaying the filing of the Inventory until November, 1984. 
11. The Inventory, and the estate and gift tax returns, 
while signed by Ebert, were prepared under the direction and 
advice of Clyde, Pratt, Gibbs and Cahoon, Frank J, Allen and 
Richard C. Cahoon in particular as counsel, and DeNiro & Thorne, 
Certified Public Accountants, and the valuations stated therein 
represent their advice and are reasonable valuations for the 
purposes intended thereby. 
12. Morgan, Jr., upon learning of the gift of the Wyco 
stock to Ebert went to Jay B. Bell of Fabian & Clendenin, his 
longstanding counsel, to see about attacking it with the object 
being to create a claim to remove Ebert as trustee, which would 
result in Ebert's removal as President of Wyco and of Justheim 
Petroleum, in which Morgan was an investor and director until 
Ebert caused him to be removed, that Morgan, Jr. is in fact paying 
the fees of Fabian & Clendenin in prosecuting this demand petition 
in the name of Fabianfs longstanding client, ST. Mark's Cathedral; 
and the other petitioners are represented by J.R. Bell, father of 
Jay B. Bell. 
-6-
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13. Justheim intended and desired that Ebert be his 
personal representative and trustee at the time he made gifts of 
the Wyco stock, and that regardless of the validity of the gifts, 
no grounds exist for removal of Ebert because Justheim, having 
been fully aware of the potential conflict between Morgan, Jr. and 
Ebert as to the ownership and control of Wyco, nevertheless 
appointed him trustee and therefore Ebert may be removed only for 
demonstrated abuse of power detrimental to the trust, and not 
merely because he claims the gift. Respondent claims that in 
answering ownership of the stock, he is carrying out the intent of 
Justheim in keeping the stock from the influence and control of 
Morgan. 
III. Uncontested Facts: 
A. On June 22, 1978, Clarence I. Justheim, as trustor, 
and Ebert as trustee, created a $25.00 "pour-over" trust, 
identified above as the "Justheim Trust". 
B. On June 22, 1978, Justheim also executed a Last Will 
and Testament (hereinafter the "Justheim Will"), under which Ebert 
was named to serve as personal representative of the Justheim 
Estate upon Justheim's death. 
C. Under the Justheim Will, all of Justheim's property, 
except his personal effects and property previously transferred to 
the Justheim Trust during Justheim's life, was bequeathed to Ebert 
as Trustee of the Justheim Trust, to be administered and 
distributed by Ebert according to the terms of said Trust. 
-7-
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D. Petitioners are beneficiaries under the Justheim 
Trust. 
E. On June 22, 1978, Justheim owned 127,743 shares of 
Wyoming Petroleum Corporation stock represented by the following 
certificates: 
CERTIFICATE NO. NO. OF SHARES 
139 
207 
233 
271 
273 
279 
138 
219 
231 
245 
297 
1 
15,000 
730 
22,500 
9,712 
8,963 
30,000 
8,025 
25,000 
500 
7,312 
127,743 
F. In the spring of 1982, Justheim acquired an 
additional 23,400 shares of Wyoming Petroleum stock as follows: 
CERTIFICATE NO. NO. OF SHARES 
301 
302 
3,400 
20,000 
23,400 
G. On April 13, 1983, Ebert was appointed Guardian of 
the Person and Conservator of the Estate of Clarence I. Justheim, 
a protected person. 
H. Justheim died on July 3, 1983. 
I. Following the death of Clarence Justheim the Justheim 
Will was informally probated and Ebert informally appointed as 
personal representative of the Justheim Estate. 
-8-
002! P? *" I 
J, At such time, a typewritten document purporting to be 
a codicil to the Justheim Will (hereinafter the "codicil") was 
given to the Court but was not informally probated. The codicil 
is dated May 29, 1981, is unwitnessed and purports to bequeath to 
Ebert all of Justheim1s stock in Wyoming Petroleum Corporation. 
K. On or about October 24, 1983, Ebert delivered all of 
the above-described certificates of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation 
stock to the transfer agent and asked that they be, and they were, 
transferred into Ebert's name and into the names of various 
members of his family. Ebert now claims that he and his family 
own the stock. 
L. On October 3, 1984, Ebert as Personal Representative 
of the Estate of Clarence I. Justheim signed and caused to be 
filed with the IRS a Federal Gift Tax Return prepared by Clyde & 
Pratt, and John Deniro, pertaining to the alleged 1981 gift of 
120,431 shares of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation stock, which 
return valued said stock at $30,108. 
M. On October 16, 1984, Ebert as Personal Representative 
of the Estate of Clarence I. Justheim filed with the Court an 
Inventory of the property of said Estate, prepared by Clyde & 
Pratt, and John DeNiro which says Ebert claims that Justheim gave 
to Ebert 120,431 shares of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation stock in 
the Spring of 1981, and an additional 30,712 shares in the Spring 
of 1982. Said stock is valued at $37,826.00 in said Inventory. 
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IV. Contested Issues of Fact: 
A. Did Justheim deliver to Ebert any of the stock 
certificates in controversy with the present intent to make a gift 
of such stock to Ebert? 
B. Did Justheim intend that any gift or gifts not take 
effect until Justheim's death? 
C. Was Ebert a person to whom Justheim would naturally 
give such stock; does any evidence, independent of Ebert's 
possession of the certificatesf exist to corrobrate the gift? 
D. Did Ebert accept dominion and control over said stock 
at the time any gift or gifts were made or attempted? 
E. If Justheim gave any of the stock certificates to 
Ebert, was Justheim intending to make a gift to Ebert individually 
or to Ebert as trustee of the Justheim Trust? 
F. Did Ebert procure any transfer of stock by exercising 
undue influence over Justheim? 
G. Was Ebert a fiduciary to, a confidential advisor to, 
or in a confidential relationship with Justheim? 
H. If there were any gift or gifts of stock from 
Justheim to Ebert, were the gifts fair in all respects? 
I. Did Ebert fail to exercise reasonable care as a 
fiduciary in administering Justheim's estate? 
J. Did Ebert act in conflict of interest in 
administering Justheim's estate? 
K. Has Ebert misstated the value of the stock in the 
Inventory filed with the Court and in the Federal Gift Tax Return? 
-10-
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L. Has Ebert acted improperly in his untimely filing of 
the gift tax return reporting said alleged gift? 
M. Is this removal petition in fact processed by John H. 
Morgan, Jr. to further his own business interest? 
V. Contested Issues of Law: 
A. Were there any effective inter vivos gifts of stock 
of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation from Justheim to Ebert* 
B. At the times the alleged gifts were made, did Ebert 
owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty and care to Clarence Justheim and 
to the Justheim Trust? 
C. Are the claimed gifts of stock presumptively invalid 
by reason of Ebert1s relationship with Justheim. 
D. Are the claimed gifts of stock presumed to be a 
transfer to Ebert as trustee rather than a gift to Ebert 
individually? 
E. Does reasonable cause exist for Ebert's removal as 
Trustee of the Justheim Trust and as Personal Representative of 
the Justheim Estate. 
F. Are the gifts presumptively valid from Ebert's 
possession of the certificates and other surrounding circumstances? 
VI. Exhibits: 
All exhibits shall be exchanged by the parties prior to 
trial. 
-11-
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VII. Witnesses: 
A. Petitioners 
1* Petitioners will call the following witnesses: 
a. Raymond A. Ebert 
b. Frank Allen 
c. Michael Bennion 
2. Petitioners may call the following witnesses: 
a. John Morgan 
b. Richard Cahoon 
c. John DeNiro 
d. Steven White 
e. Wayne Elggren 
f. Dr. John Henrie 
3. Petitioners may use the following depositions: 
a. Dr. John Henrie 
B. Respondent may call any of the above, and 
a. Florence Tierney 
b. Fran Albreicht 
VIII. Discovery is complete. 
IX. Trial Briefs are to be filed with the Clerk and copies 
furnished to opposing counsel by . 
This matter is set for pretrial conference on 
Estimated time of trial is four days. 
-12-
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X. The foregoing admissions having been made by the parties, and 
the parties having specified the foregoing issues of fact and law 
remaining to be litigated, this order shall supplement the 
pleadings and govern the course of the trial of this case, unless 
modified to prevent manifest injustice. 
DATED this day of , 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
D i s t r i c t Judge 
APPROVED: 
w. 
J. 
Cullen Battle 
Richard Bell 
Joseph J. Palmer 
Frank J . A l l e n 
- 1 3 -
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J. RICHARD BELL 
JACQUE B. BELL 
BELL & BELL 
303 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone 487-7756 
Attorneys for Heirs and Beneficiaries _ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ) 
NOTICE OF AMENDMENT TO 
CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM, ) PRE-TRIAL ORDER 
Deceased. ) Probate No. P-83-695 
The Honorable Philip R. Fishier 
Notice is hereby given that the attorneys for Priscilla 
Knight as Personal Representative of the Estate of Charles Justheira, 
Madelaine L. Harris, Patricia J. Brown; and two of the beneficiaries 
under the trust: Dean of St. Marks Episcopal Cathedral Parish and 
St. Marks Episcopal Cathedral Parish, move to amend the Pre-Trial 
Order entered by this Court on the 30th day of October, 1984, at 
page 2 by adding the following: 
(9) Ebert has misrepresented the size of the estate to the 
heirs and beneficiaries; 
(10) Ebert failed to give notice to heirs and beneficiaries 
as required by law. 
(11) Ebert has beert deceptive and secretive and has followed 
a course of conduct in his capacity as Personal Representative as 
above set forth which is not in the best interests of the Estate. 
(12) Ebert f.s many positions as Personal Representative '£* U. ik.T 3 
/mvrrrv* 
and Trustee under the Trust of the Estate of Clarence 1. Justhelm, 
Personal Representative and Trustee under the Trust of the Estate 
of Margaret Justhelm; Conservator and Guardian of Margaret Justhelm; 
stockholder, President and Director of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation; 
stockholder, President and Director of Justhelm Petroleum Corporation; 
causes him, Ebert, to be in so many potentially conflicting interests 
situations as to require his removal as being in the best Interests 
of the Estate. 
Oral notice of this proposed Amendment has been given to 
adverse party In keeping with the Court's oral Order to respond to 
to oral Interrogatories. 
Dated this 26th day of May, 1986. 
BELL fe BELL, by 
J . "RrcRafcJ Be IT 
MAILINGCERTIFICATE 
A true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed this 26th 
day of May, 1986, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Joseph J. Palmer, Esq. 
Moyle & Draper 
600 Deseret Plaza 
It 15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and 
W. Cullen Battle Esq. 
Fabian and Clendentn 
12th Floor 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah B4U-2309 
-2- 00Z510 
and 
Frank J. Allen, Esq. 
Clyde, Pratt, Glbbs & Cahoon 
77 West 72nd South, No. 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
-3-
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FILMED 
Joseph J. Palmer (#2505) of 
MOYLE 8. DRAPER, P.C. 
Attorneys for Raymond A. Ebert 
600 Deseret Plaza 
No. 15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1901 
Telephone (801) 521-0250 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM, 
Deceased. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Probate No. P-83-695 
(The Honorable Philip R. 
Fishier) 
* * * * * * * 
This action came on regularly for trial before the 
Honorable Philip R. Fishier, sitting without a jury, on May 27, 
28, 29, 30, and June 3, for closing argument on June 23, for 
the Court's initial ruling on June 25, and for further argument 
and the Court's final ruling on July 21 and 28, 1986. J. 
Richard Bell appeared for certain Beneficiaries: Priscilla 
Knight as Personal Representative of the Estate of Charles 
Justheim, Madelaine L. Harris, Patricia J. Brown, St. Mark's 
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Episcopal Cathedral Parish and Dean of St. Mark's Episcopal 
Cathedral (hereafter -Knight-Church-). Kent M. Kasting 
appeared for himself as Guardian Ad Litem for Margaret L. 
Justheim, a Beneficiary. Clark P. Giles appeared for 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a Beneficiary. Frank J. 
Allen appeared for Raymond A. Ebert, as Personal Representative 
of the Estate of Clarence I. Justheim. Joseph J. Palmer 
appeared for Raymond A. Ebert, as Personal Representative and 
as an individual (hereafter -EbertH). 
The action came on based upon the Petition of Knight-Church 
for Removal of Raymond A. Ebert as Personal Representative of 
the Estate of Clarence I. Justheim (hereafter -Estate-) and as 
Trustee of the inter vivos trusts created or to be created 
pursuant to the Justheim Trust dated June 22, 1978, as amended 
(hereafter -Trust-), and further based upon the Pretrial Order 
of October 30, 1984 as supplemented by the Knight-Church Notice 
of Amendment, dated May 26, 1986. 
At the inception of trial, Charles M. Bennett appeared for 
John M. Morgan, Jr. (-Morgan-). Ebert objected to the standing 
of Morgan to appear. Based upon the oral stipulation of all 
parties in open court, the issue of Morgan's standing was 
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reserved, and he was permitted to appear for the limited 
purpose of joining in the Knight-Church Removal Petitions. The 
latter and Morgan are hereafter referred to as -Petitioners". 
The parties stipulated that the Court would reserve and not 
now determine the issue of whether Clarence I. Justheim made 
valid inter vivos gifts of 151#143 shares of Wyoming Petroleum 
Company ("Wyoco") common stock to Ebert and that the parties 
might offer further evidence on that issue. These Findings and 
Conclusions are not intended to be the findings and conclusions 
on that issue. Petitioners did, however, offer evidence on 
their claims that one reason, among others, Ebert should be 
removed is because the gifts of the Wyoco stock were invalid. 
Based upon the evidence, and the parties having rested and 
submitted memoranda and closing argument, and the Court being 
fully advised, the Court now makes and enters these: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Parties established the following facts by a 
preponderance of the evidence: 
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A. Ebert was Clarence's closest personal friend for 
many years. Ebert began working for Clarence as "an 
administrative assistant, courier, confidant and general 'right 
hand man'" (Exhibit 32) in late 1978 following an automobile 
accident involving Clarence. Mr. Ebert continued in that 
capacity until Clarence's death in July 1983. 
B. In helping Clarence, Ebert assumed a position of 
some trust and confidential responsibility. Clarence depended 
on Ebert for many business and personal matters and trusted him 
without reservation. Ebert did not have a position of 
superiority or dominance over Clarence. 
C. Clarence's foremost concern in the last few years 
of his life was the care of his wife Margaret. Margaret was 
substantially incapable of taking care of her affairs during 
the relevant time period. 
D. Clarence was concerned that he could not take care 
of Margaret. Clarence sought the help of friends and 
associates. 
E. Clarence was a demanding and dominating person. 
As he grew older, he became increasingly difficult to work 
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with. As a result, several nurses hired after his accident in 
November 1978 quit their jobs. 
F. In order to induce people to help him, Clarence 
began to make promises to his friends and associates in order 
to obtain their cooperation. 
G. With regard to Ebert, Clarence stated on several 
occasions that he would take care of Ebert. 
H. On May 29, 1981, Clarence executed a document 
purported to be a codicil which he had asked Ebert to type. 
The purported codicil devised all of Clarence's Wyoming 
Petroleum stock to Ebert. However, the codicil was not 
witnessed. 
I. The Wyoming Petroleum stock was a valuable asset 
to Clarence. Early in 1981, Clarence asked his attorney, Frank 
Allen, if he could make a gift of Wyoco stock to Ebert without 
transferring it on the corporate books because Clarence did not 
want Morgan to know of it. Allen told Clarence he could make a 
valid gift of stock by handing Ebert the certificates and 
declaring that he was giving it to him, and that the 
certificates should be endorsed or a stock power should be 
given. Clarence never again discussed a gift of Wyoco Stock 
with Allen. 
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J- After Clarence died, Ebert learned from Frank 
Allen, who was appointed as his attorney as personal 
representative of the estate, that the codicil was invalid for 
lack of witnesses. 
K. Ebert claimed that Clarence gave him 120,431 
shares of Wyoco stock on May 15, 1981, which left Clarence with 
6,312 shares. Ebert claimed Clarence told him not to transfer 
the certificates into his name until after his death and to 
keep the fact of the gifts secret because Clarence did not want 
Morgan to find out about the gifts. 
L. John Morgan, Sr. (-Morgan Sr.") died in February 
1982; then he, family members and others and Clarence, his 
family members and others, each owned approximately the same 
number of shares of Wyoco. 
M. Immediately following Morgan Sr.'s death, Clarence 
determined that the agreement between him and Morgan Sr. to 
keep an equal number of shares was no longer valid, and 
Clarence further determined to obtain additional stock of Wyoco 
in order to obtain control of the corporation. 
N. Ebert assisted Clarence in this endeavor by 
checking shareholder lists and by making several trips to 
Wyoming to obtain 20,000 shares of stock and an additional 
3,400 shares from New Jersey which represented the "control 
stock". 
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O. Shortly after the -control stock- was obtained by 
Clarence, Ebert claimed Clarence gave Ebert an additional 
30,712 shares of Wyoco. These shares represented the -control 
stock" and the remaining 6,312 shares of the stock remaining 
with Clarence after the claimed first gift. Ebert claimed 
Clarence again told him not to transfer the certificates into 
his name and to keep the fact of the gifts secret because 
Clarence did not want Morgan to find out about the gifts. 
P. Both Ebert and Allen testified that, in July or 
August 1983, Ebert told Allen the facts about the purported 
gifts. Allen told Ebert that in his opinion, if the Court 
determined the facts to be as Ebert claimed, each of the gifts 
was probably valid even if unendorsed and that the codicil had 
some probative value to prove the gifts. Allen told Ebert, 
however, that all of the facts would have to be disclosed to 
the Court and the Court would have to determine if the gifts 
were valid. Neither Ebert nor Allen disclosed the facts 
surrounding the alleged gifts to either the court or the 
ultimate beneficiaries of the estate until after a petition was 
brought by St. Mark's Church in June 1984, seeking the recovery 
of the stock and Ebert's removal as personal representative of 
the estate. 
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Q. Without approval of the Court or notice to his 
attorney or the estate's ultimate beneficiaries, Ebert 
transferred the disputed stock to himself and members of his 
family on October 24, 1983, When he did so, Ebert believed 
that he and Allen would cause all of the facts supporting 
Ebert*s gift claims to be submitted to and determined by the 
Court. In October 1984, Ebert and his family caused all of the 
stock to be deposited with Allen pending this Court's final 
determination of the gift claims. 
R. To transfer the stock to himself and his family, 
Ebert delivered the disputed stock certificates to the transfer 
agent for Wyoming Petroleum with two letters dated October 24, 
1983. Some of the stock certificates presented for transfer 
had not been endorsed. Ebert included a copy of the codicil 
which Ebert knew was invalid. Ebert referred to the codicil in 
the letter that accompanied the unsigned stock certificates and 
stated that: "The Codicil bequeathed to me all of Clarence I. 
JustheinTs interest in Wyoming Petroleum Corp.- Ebert intended 
that the transfer agent rely upon the codicil in transferring 
the stock to Ebert. Ebert was relying on the advice Allen had 
given him in July or August 1983 in so doing. 
S. Ebert is currently the personal representative of 
the estate, the conservator of Margaret JustheinTs estate, the 
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largest individual shareholder in Justheim Petroleum (other 
than the estate), the president and a director of Justheim 
Petroleum, and the president and a director of Wyoming 
Petroleum. Clarence anticipated and intended Ebert would be 
the personal representative of his estate. 
T. Allen is currently the secretary, a director and a 
shareholder of Justheim Petroleum, the attorney for Justheim 
Petroleum, the attorney for Ebert as personal representative of 
the estate, and the attorney for Ebert as the conservator of 
Margaret Justheim. Allen was secretary, a director and a 
shareholder of Justheim Petroleum during Clarence's life, and 
was Clarence's personal attorney. 
2. The Petitioners failed to prove the following 
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence: 
A. That Ebert improperly caused 151,143 shares of 
Wyoco common stock to be transferred into his and his donees' 
names. 
B. That Wyoco stock was never given to Ebert by 
Clarence during Clarence's life, that the Wyoco stock was given 
to Ebert in his capacity as trustee of the Trust, or that these 
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gifts were intended by Clarence to take effect after Clarence's 
3eath. 
C. That these gifts were made as a result of undue 
influence by Ebert in his position as trustee, confidential 
advisor or fiduciary to Clarence. 
D. That Ebert, as Personal Representative of the 
Justheim Estate, should have sought court approval of the 
alleged gifts prior to the transfer of the Wyoco shares into 
Ebert's and his donees' names. 
E. That the Petitioners were damaged by Ebert's 
transfer of the Wyoco stock to himself and his donees. 
F. That Ebert, as Personal Representative, committed 
misfeasance with regard to the time of filing of a federal gift 
tax return reporting the alleged gift or gifts and in the 
valuation of the Wyoco stock in the gift tax return. 
G. That Ebert otherwise misrepresented the value of 
the Wyoco stock in documents filed with the Court. 
H. That Ebert misrepresented the size of the estate 
to the heirs and beneficiaries. 
I. That Ebert failed to give notice to heirs and 
beneficiaries as required by law. 
J. That Ebert has been deceptive, misleading, 
secretive, or has followed a course of conduct in his capacity 
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a Personal Representative which is not in the best interests of 
the Estate, 
K. That Ebert's positions as Personal Representative 
and Trustee of the Estate and the Trust of Clarence I. 
Justheim, Personal Representative and Trustee of the Estate and 
the Trust of Margaret Justheim, Conservator and Guardian of 
Margaret Justheim, stockholder, president and director of 
Wyoming Petroleum Corporation, stockholder, president and 
director of Justheim Petroleum Corporation, are such 
potentially conflicting interests as to require his removal in 
the best interests of the Estate. 
L. That Ebert has failed to timely pursue and 
discover assets and potential assets of the Estate. 
M. That Ebert has failed to account for assets or 
potential assets of the Estate. 
N. That Ebert has attempted to conceal or cover up 
the basis of his claim to the gifts of Wyoco stock. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes and enters these: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Ebert did not havo a confidential relationship with 
sClarence.y 
£/. The Court concludes that the Petitioners have failed 
fto show by a preponderance of the evidence: 
A. that Ebert has breached any duty to the estate; or 
B. that it is in the best interests of the Estate of 
Clarence I. Justheim that Ebert be removed as Personal 
Representative of the Estate or as Trustee of the 
Trusts created by Clarence I. Justheim under Trust 
>nt dated June 22, 1978, as amended. 
Theretore,%the Petition to remove Ebert should be denied. 
Dated: 3 / , n&<> 
BY THE COURT 
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And I haven't really articulated it in my own mind very well, 
but I think we need to raise it. 
Mr. Bell raised some issues, for example, notice 
to the heirs by Mr. Ebert as part of his case. As part of 
his theory. And the problem I have with that is that I see 
this as a very narrow question. Was there a gift? That is, 
did Mr. Justheim have the intent to make a gift, and was 
there delivery. The issue of whether or not Mr. Ebert gave 
proper notice to the heirs under the laws of Utah has been 
resolved and finally determined by Judge Fishier in the 
removal hearing. 
And to bring up the idea that he may have given 
improper notice, I think, is res judicata. And I think that 
should be excluded. And I think also that would relate to 
the removal position, and all of those issues were outlined 
in the supplementary pretrial order, and issues of improper 
notice, improper valuation of stock, those types of things 
were excluded by the pretrial order. 
MR. PALMER: And ruled upon. 
THE COURT: Mr. Bell? 
MR. BELL: Mr. Ebert has several hats, 
Your Honor, and the first hat, of course, is the petition 
for probate. But in addition to that he is the trustee of 
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a trust or a pour-over Will that he is going to administer. 
He has a duty to those beneficiaries, or ultimate beneficiaries 
and when Mr. Justheim died, he made no attempt to contract 
those beneficiaries who have an interest in this case, aside 
from what the statute says, and he has a duty to keep them 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
- _62 
informed. And he didn't. The evidence will show that he 
didn't attempt to contact because he says, "I didn't know 
their addresses." 
I have evidence that he did know the addresses, 
and--
THE COURT: Was he obligated to notify 
them? 
MR. BELL: I think I want to try to 
establish that he didn't notify them. He is trustee. And 
let the Jury determine if that would have been the right 
thing to do. I'm not claiming that the statute says that 
you shall do it. 
MR. PALMER: It specifically says he i 
didn't have to do it. 
MR. BELL: That's—the statute you are 
talking about is the notice of the Will. I'm talking about 
his duty as trustee. 
THE COURT: Did he have any duty as a 
trustee to notify them? 
MR. BELL: Sure. I think he did. 
THE COURT: Where in the trust or in the 
statutes or in the case law does it indicate he has such a 
duty? 
MR. BELL: He has a fiduciary duty. 
THE COURT: What interest did they have 
I 
in the Wyoco stock? 
MR. BELL: People that would eventually--] 
it would eventually come to them. Ifm not arguing about 
63 
the stock, I'm talking about the fact that he never notified 
them at all. 
THE COURT: Of what? 
MR. BELL: About the death of Justheim, 
and there is a trust under which they will receive a benefit, 
or could receive a benefit. They have an interest in that 
and they ought to have been notified by him as trustee. 
THE COURT: What does that have to do 
with a gift? 
MR. BELL: All Ifm claiming for that 
is the fact that he—first of all, he doesn't tell them 
there is anything going on. It is hush-hush, so to speak. 
Nobody except him knows what is going on, and he is trying 
to keep the whole thing quiet. 
THE COURT: It sounds like undue 
influence to me. 
MR. BELL: No. 
THE COURT: Or after the fact — 
MR. BELL: That's ripping off the 
estate and not telling anybody. Claiming stock by gift 
that nobody knows about because there is no notice to anybody 
generally about the estate or generally about what they are 
going to do. 
THE COURT: Are you claiming that there 
is fraud here? 
MR. BELL: Ifm claiming—claiming that--
yes, sure. Ifm claiming that there is fraud. He claims 
this as a gift, and it is nothing more than a ripoff of the v . 
